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Distinctions and Something Between:
An Inspection of Eviatar Zerubavel’s Concept Driven Sociology
Krzysztof T. Konecki
Lodz University, Poland

The paper presents short summaries and analyses of two books by Eviatar Zerubavel
(2018a; 2020) that are demonstrations of his approach to cognitive sociology. The first
book (2018a) shows examples of the analysis in Zerubavelian cognitive sociology, and
the second one is a methodological and theoretical elaboration of his approach
described in formal terms. We analyze the approach presented at the end of the paper,
showing that the analysis of distinctions and perceptive categories is essential in
Zerubavel analysis. Still, there is an unclear dimension (in between) included in the
contexts of perception, lived experiences, and perception of the world beyond the
categories that we introduce in our analysis.

Keywords: Zerubavelian cognitive sociology, semiotics, grounded theory

Presentation of the Books and Concepts
Eviatar Zerubavel (2020) recently wrote a book that summarizes his approach to
analyzing social phenomena from a cognitive sociology perspective. This perspective is rooted
in interactionist tradition, especially in Simmelian sociology and Goffmanian perspective. The
perception of reality is socially framed, and we use it in interactions, usually when we do not
know about the origin of our categories of perception or about the ignorance that comes from
the blindness created by the points of attention that is ignited by the inherited cognitive frames
for perception and categories of seeing and not seeing some objects. Therefore, how can we
analyze ignored phenomena and facts that are so close to us and possibly in direct view?
Zerubavel shows a practical method of analysis in the book Taken for Granted: The
Remarkable Power of the Unremarkable, published in 2018. It presents the method of
analyzing the areas of ignorance and imperception that are in the background of what we see.
The author shows that when we concentrate more on one part of a phenomenon, we do not see
another, obvious part; one that is, for this reason, not marked.
We assume the second part of the distinction in a category by default and take it for
granted. When we say “woman murderer,” we mark it; when we say murderer, we believe that
it is a man. Usually, an occupations’ labels are considered masculine; otherwise, they are
marked as feminine. We should not exceed the masculine labels, and we assume that
occupations and professions are mainly masculine (for example, a plumber). Among many
anthropologists, the word man is practically a synonym of male, although it theoretically refers
to human beings (Perez, 2019, p. 4). Seemingly, gender-neutral labels such as user, participant,
person, designer, or researcher were perceived mainly as masculine in gender (Bradley et al.,
2015). When we label homosexuals, we hide heterosexuals, whom we take for granted. These
lexical gaps arise when we rarely use some terms because some objects are understood per
se and do not need explanations with other words.
The sociologist’s goal, which uses the cognitive perspective in the analysis, is to show
how phenomena are perceived and not perceived. This goal is expressed in the sentence below:
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Studying the unmarked, in short, requires exceptional self-reflectiveness about
what we habitually and thus pre-reflectively take for granted! (Zerubavel,
2018a, p. 9)
The sociology of looking for unarticulated and silenced phenomena is the sociology of
everyday life. Therefore, the politics of attention management exists in our everyday life, in
the language used in the media and ordinary conversations. Not noticing something is
meaningful, and it could have political meanings in relation to power. The first is the power of
language, and secondly, it is connected with social structure and institutions. Social order could
be maintained by using certain linguistic categories and assuming other ones. Unmarkedness
is a political tool that is often used unconsciously by social actors, and revealing this
phenomenon is a goal of cognitive sociologists. Gender and color are often assumed, if not
mentioned; when we speak about humans, they are usually considered male and white.
Dominance is included in the frames of how reality is perceived, although it is called normality
(Zerubavel, 2018b, p. 58). Discussions about these frames of perception could be liberating, or
they might start a new way of perceiving social objects. I think it is also a socially important
consequence of Zerubavelian sociology.
Naming some unmarked phenomena makes them visible (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 65).
Studying maleness shows male language’s dominance and the dominance of maleness in the
social structure (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 69).
We see that a person is social and is socially determined in his or her perception.
Socialized language is vital for reproducing social structure and power. To build the conceptual
structure of this cognitive determination, Zerubavel refers to the semiotics of Nikolai
Trubetzkoy, and of fellow linguist, Roman Jakobson. Social distinctions are derivatives of the
perceptive categories and marking or not marking some part of the categories that make
distinctions. One thing can be unique and marked, while something else is “normal” and
“ordinary,” not significant enough to mark and mention in the public discourse (Zerubavel,
2018a, p. 97). Society produces attentional norms – what it is vital to see and talk about, and
what it is not essential to notice. And these “unimportant to notice” objects could be decisive
in keeping social order intact. Unmarkedness is meaningful. Zerubavel delivers a tool to
uncover what is not mentioned, to foreground what is implicit. The dominance of some social
forces could be made explicit. Personal feelings could be less important than attentional norms
and subsequent perceptions of the social world.
***
The second book I present in this paper, Generally Speaking: An Invitation to Concept
Driven Sociology, summarizes the methodological and epistemological knowledge that comes
from the scientific work experiences of Eviatar Zerubavel, who created and used theoretical
concepts to analyze social phenomena in sociology. The book refers to many of the author’s
previous publications, so at the beginning, I mention mainly the first important breakthrough
book here (The Fine Line. Making Distinctions in Everyday Life, 1991), where inspiration from
gestalt psychology is the start of thinking on perceived and not perceived objects and the sociopsychological phenomena of ignoring, the conspiracy of silence, social distinctions, fuzzy
minds, “unmarkedness,” and semiotic asymmetry, which we can find in the author’s other
books (Zerubavel, 2015a, 2015b, 2018a).
Zerubavel is skeptical about the division of theory and methodology, writing that it is
a “false distinction.” He states that theory and methodology are strictly connected. A theory is
needed to see something at all, while an a priori scheme of perception is needed in research.
Zerubavel is not a data-driven analyst, as he testifies in the book (Zerubavel, 2020, p. 2). His
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concept-driven sociology is from a different perspective than grounded theory (GT). GT is a
data-driven methodology, and concepts are created in collecting and analyzing empirical data.
However, the goal is the same, that is, to create a theory to understand phenomena and the
conditions for their existence. Looking for patterns is the main strategy of concept-driven
sociology. Grounded theory also aims to reconstruct patterns, but it starts with data and the
analysis of the data, sometimes with the help of sensitizing concepts (Blumer, 1969; Charmaz,
2006).
At the beginning of any research, analyst-researchers (they should be called analysts
because they analyze extant data more than ethnographically collected data) follow proto-ideas
(Zerubavel, 2020, p. 4), which leads them to observe reality and analyze it through the prisms
of concepts. Later, analyst-researchers sharpen the categories and make them clear-cut
concepts. These proto-concepts, and the topics associated with them, lead sociologists in their
analytical work and help them focus on examples that help define concepts that describe some
social phenomena theoretically (Zerubavel, 2020, p. 7). Existing concepts might be useful to
see and analyze the social reality; so, generally, a scientist’s attentional socialization helps him
or her see some phenomena.
By using or creating concepts through generalizations, one can transgress the borders
of situations, societies, or historical periods, as in the analysis of totemism in Australia
(Zerubavel, 2020, p. 13). This is formal sociology (in reference to Simmel), which can be
applied in many situations by transgressing them (Zerubavel, 1980, 1995). Zerubavel goes into
trans-situational, conceptual sociology, which creates general concepts but not universal ones,
which he explicitly underlines (Zerubavel, 2020, pp. 17-18).
Exampling is a strategy to show and sensitize the constructed concepts. Examples are
treated as data that help to theorize, and this strategy is very similar to the one used by Erving
Goffman (1974) in many of his analyses. Examples might represent patterns. Exemplification
proves and shows the concretization of concepts, categories, and patterns of conceptually
described phenomena. This is what happens in concept-driven sociology, and it is similar to
presenting analytical reports in constructivist grounded theory research (Charmaz, 2006).
Examples from a different context—situational, historical, or cultural—might ensure the
generalizability of the concept. Thus, researchers look for similarities, lumping them from these
examples but ignoring any differences and peculiarities (Zerubavel, 2020, pp. 27-29).
When comparing empirical cases from different contexts or different structural levels
of society, we think analogically. The analyst-researcher ignores singularity and disregards
context—historical or cultural—in formulating patterns. If he or she analyzes collective
remembering, for example, the political fight over the tokens that are important in our past can
be seen. Sometimes we have a redefinition of collective memory, exemplified in historical
handbooks at school, or in the erecting of new monuments, or the naming of streets, airports,
or railway stations for national heroes, which can signify a new vision of the past.
Zerubavel states that removing the context during an analysis is a methodological virtue
(Zerubavel, 2020, p. 63). Analogical transfers might be very illuminating and creative, and
comparative analysis across substantive fields was also the methodological principle used by
Everett Hughes (Hughes, 1971, p. 316). Zerubavel believes that breaking the habit of seeking
differences and starting to look for similarities between “incomparable objects” might give us
innovative findings (Zerubavel, 2020, pp. 70-71), and he also states that looking for deep
commonalities can even give analysts aesthetic pleasure.
Analysis
We need concepts to see reality from a particular perspective. This is the obvious truth,
and we all probably agree. We see reality through filters, special spectacles, and reconstructing
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it can reveal the veiled dimensions of social life. I can agree with this option of analysis.
However, we need more spectacles to see more—and not only inherited concepts. We want to
look for slots in reality to find something new. We need to contemplate when to choose the
concepts or theories or to create new concepts. Why do we change the filter of perception?
Why do we change the spectacles? What is the reason for choosing this kind of concept and
not another one? What are we really looking for by using concepts if we know in advance what
the reality is?
When I have chosen the concepts, I should ask: How did I find myself at this moment
of theorizing? What existed before in my theorizing situation, what is there now, and what do
I want to achieve with these concepts? Thus, we need contemplation at that moment (Bentz &
Giorgino, 2016). When we follow the concept of looking at reality, we can be concise and
disciplined in our investigation endeavor. Still, in this way, we can lose what the proto-ideas
that lead us do not notice. These other phenomena (they may be casual or intervening
conditions) do exist in reality, however, and they could influence phenomena named with
preconceived concepts. All these preconceived concepts can make the researchers blind, as
they become focused on a reality that is already structured by concepts.
Abandoning the ethnographic or historical contexts of investigated phenomena could
be misleading when sharpening the concepts that might finally describe the conceptual reality
created by the researcher.
Zerubavel underlines that concept-driven sociology, being trans-contextual, that is,
crossing different substantive, historical, and cultural domains, could be a very creative
endeavor. However, theory or concepts can limit the researcher from accessing his or her
intuition—tacit knowledge that itself can inspire discoveries when exploring some domains of
reality. Below, I quote Hungarian poet and writer Sandor Marai to show that a preconceived
theory, or focusing on a theory and concepts and schemes, can limit creativity and the
motivation to work directly with some parts of reality, like sounds or bodies. A theoretically
focused mind could work in this way:
I was visited by a lawyer from Pest who now has a factory here, and he told me
that Bartók had struggled with serious financial problems in the last years of his
life. He had a chance to work at the local universities on condition that he taught
composition. But he did not want to teach composition because he was afraid
that if he became too conscious of theory, he would lose his desire to compose.
Like Mikszáth’s blacksmith, who could perform eye surgery with a penknife
until someone explained to him more precisely what the human eye actually is.
(Marai, 2017, p. 287; entry dated April 19, 1953)
Zerubavel mentions the difference between his perspective of concept-driven sociology
and grounded theory methodology (GTM): “Unlike grounded-theory practitioners, conceptdriven sociologists actually establish their initial theoretical concerns before they even start
collecting their data. It is their unmistakably conceptual focus. Indeed, that drives the empirical
part of their research” (Zerubavel, 2020, p. 6). Yes, this is a tremendous difference with any
GT. However, there are many different kinds of GT style of theorizing and research. Barney
Glaser and his school of Classical Grounded Theory are empirically driven, and they assume
an almost blank mind before going to the field of research (Glaser, 1978, 1992, 2002; Glaser
& Holton, 2004). Strauss and Corbin’s style of GTM is more moderate. Some structural
perception in reality is given a priori (conditions, causes, actions, contexts, and consequences;
Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Charmaz’s approach (2006, 2008) is, in turn, a constructivist style of
research, more abductive than deductive. Concepts are important, although they do not always
dominate when directing the researcher in searching for the properties to saturate them.
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Charmaz used preconceived concepts and treated them as sensitizing concepts, but she was not
attached to them, as is the case in concept-driven sociology. In each style of GTM, there is a
necessity to ground the categories in empirical evidence and have conceptual but empirically
based properties of categories. We can define concepts and look for their connections with each
other later. Concepts are grounded in empirical findings.
Concept-driven sociology is a kind of structuralist sociology. It is not interested in the
subject’s feelings, the lived experience or in the creation of and sometimes battle, negotiations,
or manipulations over the patterns of behaviors (described by them) imposed on the individual.
This kind of sociology is not interested in the living experiences of an individual in context.
Some structure and patterns of human minds and bodies exist. Pre-linguistic and interactionally
driven cognition, here and now, in social interaction is not the aim of such research. But it does
not mean that concept-driven research is not valid or not needed. We need to structure our
analytical endeavors to have generalizations, and we can use many inspirations from
Zerubavel’s methodological proposals, for example, analogical thinking or looking for
“unmarked phenomena.” They are also illuminating and helpful when researching lived
experiences in situational contexts. Ethnographical research also needs to reconstruct patterns
and to contemplate the subjects’ feelings in the interaction, which could enrich such research.
I personally incorporate some concept-driven sociology rules in other sociological research
styles, such as sociological ethnography, contemplative sociology, sociology based on personal
documents, and even analytical autoethnography.
As a contemplative sociologist (Konecki, 2018; see also Bentz & Giorgino, 2016), I
accept the inspiration concerning the mind’s work. The two mental processes of lumping and
splitting (Zerubavel, 1991, 2020), used to separate the island of meaning, need careful
attention. But it is also necessary to check the subjects’ living experiences and their thoughts,
body feelings, and emotions that appear during the lumping and splitting. Is it only a habitual
act or reflexive based on the commonsense analysis of the rules of behaviors and the boundaries
that they create? How can we separate mental clusters of artists from scientists if some
humanistic researchers connect both domains? (Zerubavel, 1991, p. 21) What contemplative
practices are used to make such distinctions or lumping? If we experience gaps between the
domains that induce us to divide two provinces of meaning, why do we not connect them?
What is the reason for connecting or splitting?
The gap that appears in meditation between thoughts is sometimes the aim of
meditation; however, in this situation, the void or emptiness shows the connection, not a
division. Contemplating it could explain to us why it happens. Separation also evokes feelings,
and it is fascinating what is going on during that time, at that point, or just in the image of the
separation of me from you; the separation of the frame of a picture from you in the situation of
seeing; the separation of my village from your village; the separation of present me from the
old me.
Between separated worlds, there is a “gray area,” a space where something is in the
potentiality of being; there is an uncertain feeling of something that could happen, but it is still
suspended in non-execution. Intuition might feel it, but concepts cannot describe it yet. It is a
“Country of Metaxy” (μεταξύ)—as described by Tokarczuk, (2020)—where we have a space
between two worlds, and it is blurred, unclear, and open to metaphorical, analogous thinking.
It is also immersed in non-linear being, a world where concepts overlap, where something new
and original can emerge. In the world between, symbols are not treated literally, but they give
inspiration for interpretation. There are meanings behind the literal signs that need
interpretative work and intellectual speculation. There is something between small and big
groups, between self and other, between life and death, body and mind, reason and emotions,
wisdom and stupidity, theory and empirical facts. The interbeing is often felt and experienced
but not always named. There are images, but not exact categories and concepts that divide the
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world into clear distinctive areas of being. We can look for them while analyzing general
concepts to avoid literal and distinctive thinking and to look for meanings that change and
appear in new shapes and new experiences, and that are often between.
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